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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

EPA has delegated its permit-reviewing power to the EAB,
thus granting the Board subject-matter jurisdiction over
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) preconstruction
permits. 40 C.F.R. § 124.19 (2015); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7601
(2012). Both petitioners timely filed for review of the Board’s
order, In re Sylvanergy, No. 15-0123, slip op. at 1 (EAB June 1,
2015), so this Court has jurisdiction over all “final action[s]”
taken under the CAA by the New Union Air Resources Board
(NUARB) through its EPA-delegated authority, 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1). At its root, this petition centers on an interlocutory
order and a final decision: respectively, NUARB’s denial of the
Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) and its requirement of
best available control technology (BACT) for Sylvanergy’s
greenhouse emissions. Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the
BACT determination, but not over the denial of the NAD.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Does this Court have jurisdiction to review NUARB’s denial
of the requested NAD?
II. Assuming jurisdiction over the denial of the NAD, is
Sylvanergy’s proposed plant a “major emitting facility” subject to
PSD review?
III. Did NUARB properly determine that a biomass-fueled
facility subject to PSD review for its non-greenhouse emissions is
also subject to review as an emitter of greenhouse gases?
IV. Did NUARB permissibly reject wood gasification and partial
carbon capture and storage as BACT?
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V. Did NUARB properly impose the Sustainable Forest Plan as
BACT?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

FACTS

Sylvanergy, L.L.C. resolved to construct a biomass-fired
electricity generation and wood pellet fuel production facility (the
“Facility” or the “Power Plant”) in Forestdale, New Union.
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. The Facility will produce 500 million
Btu’s each hour, and at capacity would burn 150,000 tons of dry
weight each year. Id. It will consist of an advanced stoker design
wood-fired boiler and two ultra-low sulfur diesel start-up burners,
each with a maximum heat input rate of 60 million Btu’s per
hour. Id.
Based on a 96% capacity factor, the Facility has the potential
to emit 255 tons per year of carbon monoxide, in addition to a
host of other pollutants. Id. Worried about the impact of log-truck
deliveries to the Facility, Forestdale limited its operation to no
more than 6,500 hours per year. Id. Only Forestdale’s building
inspector has the authority to enforce the limitation, which in
effect restricts the Facility to 75% capacity. Id. At 75% capacity,
the Facility will emit 190 tons per year of carbon monoxide. Id.
The Facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year of
greenhouse gases in the form of carbon dioxide equivalents. Id.
EPA has delegated authority to NUARB to issue
preconstruction permits under § 165 of the Clean Air Act. Id. On
January 15, 2013, Sylvanergy petitioned NUARB for an NAD, a
determination that it needed no PSD preconstruction permit
under § 165 of the Act. Id. In an interlocutory order, NUARB
denied Sylvanergy’s request on grounds that the Power Plant was
a major emitting facility in an attainment area under the Act—
notwithstanding the locally-enforced hours limitation—and thus
subject to more rigorous PSD review. Id. at 6. This preliminary

3
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finding ushered Sylvanergy into the heart of the PSD permitting
process. Id.
In crafting Sylvanergy’s permit, NUARB thoroughly
analyzed the available control alternatives and determined the
BACT for the pollutants emitted by the Facility, as required by §
165(a)(4). Id. at 6–7. Concerning greenhouse gases, NUARB
employed a top-down approach in analyzing the available control
alternatives. Id. First, NUARB considered carbon capture and
storage as the technology capable of achieving the greatest
reduction in emissions; the agency rejected the technology as
technically infeasible. Id. at 6. Next, the agency considered the
use of alternative fuels, like natural gas and oil; NUARB
concluded that such fuels would impermissibly redefine the
Facility. Id. at 7. NUARB also concluded that wood gasification
and partial carbon capture and storage (WGPCCS) would
impermissibly redefine the source. Id. Finally, NUARB
considered a sustainable forest plan, requiring a dedicated
reforestation area. Id. The agency concluded that acquisition of
25,000 hectares of forest land at a cost of approximately ten
million dollars was economically feasible, and that at an assumed
production rate of ten dry tons of wood per hectare per year, the
area would offset approximately seventy percent of the Facility’s
emissions. Id.
On September 12, 2013, NUARB published its draft permit
for the Facility, which included the Sustainable Forest Plan as
BACT for the Facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. Id. at 6. Save
Our Climate, Inc. (SOC), a non-profit environmental protection
group, commented extensively; the New Union Loggers
Association also commented. Id. On June 12, 2014—after nine
months during which the agency considered the permit’s
characteristics—NUARB issued its PSD permit for the
Sylvanergy Facility. Id. It retained the Sustainable Forest Plan
as BACT for greenhouse gas emissions at the Facility. Id. at 7.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
After issuance of the permit, Sylvanergy and SOC both filed
timely petitions for review with the Environmental Appeals
Board. Id. at 7. Sylvanergy challenged the denial of the NAD and
the permit’s imposition of the Sustainable Forest Plan; SOC
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challenged NUARB’s refusal to require wood gasification and
partial carbon capture and storage as BACT for the Facility. Id.
The EAB denied both petitions, pointing to a lack of jurisdiction
over the NAD and an absence of any clear factual or legal error
that would justify overturning the BACT determination; it then
ordered the Administrator of Region XIII to publish notice of final
action. Id. at 13–14. The parties then petitioned this Court for
judicial review. Id. at 1.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

As a threshold matter, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the
NAD denial. To protect the administrative process, Congress
subjects only “final action” to CAA § 307 jurisdiction. Because the
denial neither consummated NUARB’s decisionmaking nor
determined Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations, it was not
jurisdictional final action. Moreover, Sylvanergy cannot twist §
704 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to dodge the plain
rule of § 307, because the denial was committed to NUARB’s
discretion as a matter of resource management and agency
inaction. Accordingly, APA § 704 simply does not apply.
Even assuming jurisdiction, this Court should not disturb
NUARB’s determination that the Power Plant is a major emitting
facility. Although not a fossil-fuel fired source—as shown by the
plain language of the CAA and EPA guidance—the Facility still
has the potential to emit more than 250 tons per year of carbon
monoxide when operating at 96% capacity. NUARB properly
determined the Facility to be a major emitter because no federally
enforceable limitation brings it below the emissions threshold.
NUARB acted in accordance with EPA guidance, and the
Agency’s expertise on the law and science of the Clean Air Act
commands deference. This Court should therefore affirm
NUARB’s classification of the Power Plant as a major emitting
facility.
NUARB properly subjected the Power Plant to BACT for
greenhouse gases. The Supreme Court recognizes that regulation

5
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of greenhouse gases in other contexts triggered PSD
requirements for these emissions, and has ruled that permitting
agencies may require BACT for greenhouse gas emissions.
Because neither the text nor the policy of the Act justify an
exception for biogenic greenhouse gases, application of BACT to
the Facility was proper.
This Court should uphold NUARB’s determination that the
Sustainable Forest Plan constitutes BACT for the Facility’s
greenhouse gas emissions. In making its determination, the
agency properly employed a top-down approach to analyze the
universe of available control alternatives. In line with EPA
guidance, after deciding against WGPCCS, NUARB properly
embraced the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT. The agency
permissibly rejected WGPCCS because it redefines the source—
requiring it to undergo significant modifications, thereby
changing its fundamental scope. Instead, the agency properly
settled on the Plan as BACT; the Plan is economically feasible,
effective at offsetting the Facility’s emissions, and entirely within
the control of Sylvanergy.

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW
THE NAD BECAUSE IT WAS NEITHER FINAL
ACTION NOR REVIEWABLE UNDER THE APA.

Section 307 of the CAA grants this Court jurisdiction to
review “final action[s]” taken by EPA under the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1). By only opening the courthouse doors to final actions,
the CAA seeks to preserve the integrity of EPA’s robust
administrative procedures—reflecting faith in EPA adjudications
and congressional judgment that the Agency should not have to
shoulder the burden of piecemeal judicial review. FTC v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. (SOCAL), 449 U.S. 232, 242 (1980).
Because the NAD was not a “final action,” this Court lacks
jurisdiction to review its denial. Similarly, APA § 704 does not
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authorize this Court to review the NAD on review of the final
permit, because the denial was committed to NUARB’s discretion
and hence unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2).
As a question of jurisdiction, this Court reviews this issue on
a de novo standard. Columbia Riverkeeper v. U.S. Coast Guard,
761 F.3d 1084, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). And as the party that would
invoke judicial review, Sylvanergy must carry the burden of
proving jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
A.

The NAD was not a “final action,” and therefore
falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction under §
307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act.

As explained by the Supreme Court, “final action” under §
307 carries the same meaning as “final agency action” under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns,
531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). The APA does
not define “final agency action,” and the Supreme Court has
wrestled with the term for decades. 33 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8397 (3d ed.
2004) (bemoaning the confused state of the case law). But the
crux of the term is the word final, owing to the broad APA
definition of “agency action” as well as the strong judicial policy
in favor of protecting the administrative process. 5 U.S.C. §
551(13).
Under the Court’s latest interpretation, agency action is final
only if it meets two requirements. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
177–78 (1997).
First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by
which rights and obligations have been determined, or from
which legal consequences will flow.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Only if both
conditions are met is the action final for purposes of judicial
review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178.

7
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The finality of an NAD is an issue of first impression under
the Bennett standard.1 Thus, without persuasive case law, this
Court should look to the NAD’s place within the statutory scheme
of the CAA to resolve the question. Because Sylvanergy cannot
carry its burden of proof that the denial of the NAD satisfies
one—let alone both—of Bennett’s prongs, the NAD was not final
and this Court lacks jurisdiction under § 307. See Kokkonen, 511
U.S. at 377.
i.

The NAD was not final because it neither
marked the consummation of the
administrative process nor determined rights
and obligations.

The NAD begins, rather than ends, the permitting process: it
represents EPA’s opinion that a stationary source qualifies as a
“major emitting facility” subject to the PSD program, and
presages a lengthy permitting review. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475.
Although the NAD is the last word on the threshold question of
PSD applicability, definitiveness on a preliminary issue does not
itself make for final action. Indus. Customers of Nw. Util. v.
Bonneville Power Admin., 408 F.3d 638, 647 (9th Cir. 2005);
SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 244 (recognizing that preliminary agency
action is not final, even if it commits the regulated party to a full
permitting proceeding of “substantial and unrecoupable cost”).2

1. The two reported decisions on the finality of NAD-like determinations
on PSD applicability were both pre-Bennett decisions—they did not address
whether the action was final in the modern sense of the term. See P.R. Cement
Co. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir. 1989) (relying on the concepts of ripeness
and exhaustion to find that an NAD was final action); Hawaiian Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 723 F.2d 1440, 1442–43 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); cf. Unity08 v. FEC, 596
F.3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining that finality is distinct from ripeness
and exhaustion). Accordingly, these cases should not persuade this Court.
2. This Court should not warp the collateral-order doctrine to find that
the NAD is reviewable as an order “collateral” to the PSD-permitting process.
Cf. Hale v. Norton, 476 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2007). The doctrine simply does not
apply here: the PSD permit reflects the denial of the NAD, which means that
the NAD necessarily merged into the final permit. SOCAL, 449 U.S. at 246
(declining to apply the doctrine to an agency complaint of a violation where the
complaint was merely “a step toward” the final decision on the merits, and
would merge into that decision). More importantly, the doctrine does not apply
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Thus, because denying the NAD was merely the first step toward
a PSD permit, the denial was an “interlocutory” decision that did
not “consummat[e]” NUARB’s “decisionmaking process.” Bennett,
520 U.S. at 178. Accordingly, it cannot be a “final action”
reviewable under CAA § 307.
Even assuming the satisfaction of Bennett’s first prong, the
NAD is not final action because it is no more than NUARB’s
opinion on the application of law to fact. Standing alone, the
denial of the NAD has no legal force; all of Sylvanergy’s legal
obligations under the PSD program stem from the CAA itself, not
the NAD decision. Luminant Generation Co., LLC v. EPA, 757
F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that EPA notices of
violation did not meet Bennett’s second prong as the operator’s
rights and obligations did not flow from the notices but from the
Clean Air Act). Both before and after the NAD’s denial,
Sylvanergy was under an obligation not to build a major emitting
facility in Forestdale without a PSD permit—nothing changed
when NUARB rejected Sylvanergy’s petition. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a).
Rather, the denial reflected NUARB’s opinion that, under §
169(1) of the CAA, the proposed plant would be a major emitting
facility. Insofar as the NAD is just NUARB’s adoption of one
particular view of the statute, it is a far cry from final action.
AT&T Co. v. EEOC, 270 F.3d 973, 975 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the argument that an agency “takes final action when it embraces
one view of the law and rejects another,” even when “that view is
adverse to the [regulated] party”). Thus, because the denial was
neither the consummation of NUARB’s decisionmaking process
nor a determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations—and
certainly not both—it was not the sort of final action that this
Court can review. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178; 42 U.S.C. §
7607(b)(1).
ii. Binding EPA regulations reinforce this result.
EPA regulations provide that “agency action on a . . . PSD
permit” is only final upon the exhaustion of “agency review
procedures” and the issuance of “a final permit decision.” 40
where Congress enacts a “special statutory review procedure” like § 307. See
City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

9
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C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2). Those words bind this Court. Section 301 of
the CAA expressly grants rulemaking authority to EPA as
“necessary to carry out [its] function under the [Act],” and this
Court well knows that such an express delegation engages the
gears of Chevron deference. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Because this regulation was promulgated by notice-and-comment
rulemaking,3 Chevron limits this Court’s inquiry to whether the
rule is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 227 (2001).
A look at the PSD-review process shows that EPA’s
estimation of finality is not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to
the statute. Not only does EPA reach the same conclusion as it
would by applying the Bennett standard, supra Part I.a.i, but
postponing finality until the end of the permitting process
furthers the statutory goal of avoiding piecemeal judicial review.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (finding agency interpretation
reasonable because it advanced statutory purposes). Thus, any
permitting actions taken before the final permit cannot be “final
action[s]” reviewable under § 307; the denial of the NAD therefore
falls outside this Court’s jurisdiction.
B.

The NAD denial was a decision committed to
NUARB’s discretion, and accordingly this Court’s
jurisdiction over the PSD permit does not confer
the ability to review the NAD.

Although the NAD denial was non-final action outside this
Court's § 307 jurisdiction, Sylvanergy may twist the APA to
attempt an end-run around the statutory scheme. NUARB has
undeniably taken final action by issuing the PSD permit, 40
C.F.R. § 124.19(l)(2), and Sylvanergy will argue that review of the
preliminary NAD is proper on review of the final permit. See 5
U.S.C. § 704. This argument fails because the denial of the NAD
was committed to NUARB's discretion, and hence unreviewable
under APA § 701(a)(2).
3. See Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 124).
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By their own terms, the judicial-review provisions of the APA
do not apply where “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court reads
section (a)(2) as precluding review in two situations: first, where
a statute is so broadly drawn that a court would lack a
“meaningful standard” on which to judge the agency action; and
second, where “the common law of judicial review of agency
action” traditionally commits the question to the discretion of the
agency. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (recognizing that
section (a)(2) can preclude judicial review by operation of either
statutory law or the common law).
As illustrated by the presumptive unreviewability of an
agency decision to enforce or not enforce, see Heckler, 470 U.S. at
832, the common law traditionally grants agencies unreviewable
discretion in two relevant areas: (1) matters dealing with the
allocation of agency resources, and (2) matters of agency inaction.
As for the first category, courts traditionally give agencies
especial leeway to manage their resources, as such questions
require “a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are
peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.” Lincoln, 508 U.S. at
191 (citation omitted). A massive statutory scheme like the CAA
requires EPA to play an administrative game of Whack-a-Mole to
identify and curtail violations of the Act. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at
831. In deciding when and where to flex its enforcement muscles
to most effectively administer the Act, EPA’s “peculiar[] . . .
expertise” demands a long judicial leash. Id. And as for the
second category, courts treat agency inaction as discretionary
because it does not involve the exertion of “coercive power over an
individual’s liberty or property rights,” and hence steers clear of
the traditional realm of the judiciary. Id. at 832. Rather, only
when the agency “exercise[s] its power in some manner” is there
sufficient “focus for judicial review.” Id. Because the denial of the
NAD implicates both rationales, section (a)(2) bars application of
§ 704 to shoehorn review of the NAD into review of the final
permit.
At its root, the NAD is a decision tied up in questions of
resource allocation. The NAD serves as an informal method to
streamline agency oversight of stationary sources that pose only a

11
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minor threat to the environment, thus letting NUARB reserve its
fullest permitting procedures for those emitters that require
them. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and
Submittal of Implementation Plans, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,630, 27,639
(June 14, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60). Insofar as
the NAD allows NUARB to triage the calls for its attention, it
implicates agency discretion. “The agency is far better equipped
than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the
proper ordering of its priorities,” and accordingly courts will not
review management decisions like the NAD denial. Heckler, 470
U.S. at 831–32.
This Court should also view the NAD denial as an instance of
agency inaction. The denial had no independent legal effect and
thus involved no exercise of NUARB or EPA’s “coercive power.”
See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832. Just as non-enforcement has no
effect on the rights of the regulated party, neither did the NAD
denial affect Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations. See Luminant
Generation Co., 757 F.3d at 442; see also supra, Part I.a.i. This
distinction traditionally leads courts to decline review of agency
decisions without legal effect. E.g., United States v. Gary, 963
F.2d 180, 184 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding unreviewable an agency
opinion that dealt with resource management and did not
determine the regulated party’s rights and obligations).
Accordingly, the denial of the NAD is an exercise of agency
discretion “general[ly] unsuitab[le] for judicial review.” Heckler,
470 U.S. at 831.
II. THE POWER PLANT IS A “MAJOR EMITTING
FACILITY” BECAUSE IT HAS THE “POTENTIAL
TO EMIT” MORE THAN 250 TONS PER YEAR OF
CARBON MONOXIDE.
The CAA requires PSD permits for facilities that both qualify
as a "major emitting facility" and are located within an
attainment or unclassifiable areas. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. These
permits impose numerous requirements “to insure that economic
growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of
existing clean air resources.” Id. § 7470. This Court must decide
whether Sylvanergy’s Power Plant qualifies as a “major emitting
facility” subject to PSD review. A “major emitting facility” under
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the Act must either (A) be one of the 28 types of facilities listed
and “emit, or have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per
year or more of any air pollutant,” or (B) simply have “the
potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of
any air pollutant.” Id. § 7479(1).
Because the CAA does not specify a standard for judicial
review of this sort of agency action, this Court applies the default
standard of the APA and asks whether NUARB’s action was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). This Court may not
upset NUARB’s decision “if the agency’s path may reasonably be
discerned.” Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S.
461, 496–97 (2004) (citation omitted). Assuming jurisdiction, the
arbitrary and capricious standard compels this Court to affirm
NUARB’s determination of PSD applicability. Although the
Facility does not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source subject to
the 100 ton-per-year threshold under the Act, it does have the
“potential to emit” 250 tons or more per year of any air
pollutant—namely, carbon monoxide. Thus, NUARB did not act
arbitrarily in determining that the Power Plant was a major
emitting facility subject to the PSD program.
A.

The Facility is not subject to the 100 ton-per-year
threshold under CAA § 169(1) because it is not a
“fossil-fuel fired” source.

Sylvanergy proposes a 500 million Btu/hour biomass-fired
electricity generation unit in Forestdale, New Union. Sylvanergy,
slip op. at 5. The facility will contain two ultra-low sulfur diesel
(ULSD) start-up burners that each has a maximum heat input
rate of 60 million Btu/hour. Id. It contains no other component
parts potentially subject to the 100 ton-per-year limitation. See 42
U.S.C. § 7479(1). As a result, this Court must determine if the
two burners qualify the Facility as a “fossil-fuel fired” source
subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold under Section 169(1).
The unequivocal answer: They do not.
As the Supreme Court stated in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43,
courts take two steps to determine if an agency’s construction of a
statute warrants deference. First, this Court must determine
whether Congress spoke directly to the issue. Id. If so, its

13
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unambiguously expressed intent controls. Id. If not, the second
step of the analysis asks this Court to determine if the agency has
interpreted the statute permissibly. Id. Here, this Court should
stop at step one because the statutory language is clear. However,
even if this Court finds some ambiguity in the statutory
language, EPA’s permissible construction of the statute should
control.
i.

The plain language of CAA § 169(1) only
reaches sources with a heat input rate greater
than 250 million Btu/hour.

Where language is plain, this Court’s only function is to
enforce a statute according to its terms. Sebelius v. Coler, 133 S.
Ct. 1886, 1898 (2013). The Supreme Court has been adamant on
this point: rather than looking for the “reasons for what Congress
has plainly done,” courts simply give effect to the clear text. Great
W. Life & Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217–18 (2002).
Accordingly, the plain language of the CAA should end this
Court’s inquiry.
Congress explicitly aimed to regulate only fossil-fuel fired
sources that have a heat input rate of 250 million Btu/hour or
more. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). By contrast, the ULSD start-up
burners each only have a heat input rate of 60 million Btu/hour.
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. Neither burner meets the threshold.
Even combined, the units would only have a heat input rate of
120 million Btu/hour—still below the regulatory threshold. As a
result, Congress clearly and unambiguously exempted such small
fossil-fuel fired sources based on the statutory language. To hold
otherwise would “render what Congress has plainly done . . .
devoid of . . . effect.” Great W., 524 U.S. at 217–18.
Accordingly, any argument by SOC that EPA should regulate
the ULSD burners as an “embedded source” must fail. See
LaFleur v. Whitman, 300 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2002). This
contention is rooted in EPA’s guidance that “[a] source which,
when considered alone, would be major (and hence subject to
PSD) cannot ‘hide’ within a different and less restrictive source
category in order to escape applicability.” Office of Air Quality
Planning & Standards, U.S. EPA, New Source Review Workshop
Manual A.23 (draft Oct. 1990) (“NSR Manual”). Even considered
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together, the burners are not “major”: they fail to reach even 50%
of the threshold heat input rate, and there is no indication in the
record that the burners themselves would emit 100 tons per year
of any pollutant. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5; 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). As
a result, this Court should find that Sylvanergy’s Facility is not a
“fossil-fuel fired” source subject to the 100 ton-per-year threshold.
ii. Under EPA interpretations, the Facility is not
a fossil-fuel fired source because the burning
of fossil fuels is not its primary activity.
SOC will argue that the statute is ambiguous because it does
not address how EPA should classify facilities that undertake
more than one activity that may be regulated under the Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). EPA’s interpretation of the statute resolves
this alleged ambiguity, and should be afforded deference. Any
ambiguity would shift this Court’s analysis to whether the
agency’s interpretation of the statute is permissible. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843.
In August 1980, EPA addressed the classification of multiactivity facilities by promulgating rules pursuant to its authority
under § 301 of the Act. See Requirements for Preparation,
Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 45 Fed. Reg.
52,676 (Aug. 7, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52). Although
the rules adopted the statutory definition of “major emitting
facility” without substantial change, the regulatory preamble
stated that a multi-activity facility will be classified by its
primary activity. Id. at 52,695. EPA stated a source’s primary
activity “is determined by its principal product or group of
products produced.” Id. Thus, support facilities—defined as “those
which convey, store, or otherwise assist in the production of the
principal product”—do not alter a plant’s classification under the
Act. Id.
Under this “primary-activity test,” the Facility is not a
“fossil-fuel fired” source. The Facility will provide one product:
electricity. Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. This electricity comes from
the Facility’s wood-fired boiler, which harnesses the combustion
of wood pellets. Id. The ULSD burners start the fire, but have no
further role in actually generating power. Id. Thus, these start-up
burners are archetypal support facilities: they play the limited
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role of “assist[ing] in the production of the principal product”—
electricity—but do not produce it themselves. See Requirements
for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation
Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. at 52,695. Accordingly, the primary activity of
the Facility is biogenic electricity production, and Sylvanergy’s
Facility does not qualify as a “fossil-fuel fired” source.
a.

EPA’s primary-activity test warrants
deference.

Where an agency fills a gap in the statutory scheme, “a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for” the agency’s “reasonable interpretation.” Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 844. This remains the case, even though EPA set out the
primary-activity test in the regulatory preamble rather than the
regulation itself. An agency interpretation reached “through
means less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking” may
still be entitled to Chevron deference. Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 221–22 (2002). Courts determine if Chevron applies by
considering various deference-conferring factors, such as the
agency’s expertise, “the importance of the question to the
administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the agency has
given the question over a long period of time.” Id. at 222. Here,
several such factors militate in favor of Chevron deference.
To start, the CAA grants EPA extensive rulemaking
authority, showing congressional intent that EPA’s words on the
matter should carry the weight of law. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601;
Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (identifying congressional expectation that
“the agency . . . be able to speak with the force of law” as an
indicator that Chevron should apply). The scientific and technical
complexity of the issue strongly favors judicial deference. See
Marsh v. Ore. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)
(requiring courts to be at their “most deferential” when reviewing
“this kind of scientific determination”). And so does the
complexity of the Act itself. Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324,
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (deferring to agency interpretation in light
of the “technically complex statutory scheme”). Still more
importantly, Congress left the “major emitting facility” definition
alone when it enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.
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Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399; Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580 (1978) (noting that when a statute is amended, Congress
is presumed to adopt administrative interpretations of any
sections left unchanged). Finally, the primary-activity test is a
well-reasoned interpretation of the statute, as it allows EPA to
efficiently classify multi-activity sources, and has been
consistently applied for almost forty years. LaFleur, 300 F.3d at
261 (emphasizing EPA’s long-standing adherence to the primaryactivity test); Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220 (“[T]his Court will
normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation
of ‘longstanding’ duration.”).
These factors should weigh heavily in this Court’s analysis.
Accordingly, the primary-activity test should receive Chevron
deference despite the preamble’s relative informality. Barnhart,
535 U.S. at 221–22; accord Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 864
F. Supp. 2d 65, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that regulatory
preambles are worthy recipients of Chevron deference).
Even if this Court determines that Chevron deference does
not apply, EPA’s policy should receive substantial Skidmore
deference. Mead, 533 U.S at 234–35 (explaining that agency
interpretations receive deference even outside of Chevron).
Although not binding, agency policies and interpretations
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment,” and
should be afforded deference based on “the thoroughness evident
in [EPA’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and] its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements.” Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Skidmore deference carries
persuasive rather than controlling weight, but is often a deciding
factor in a complex statutory scheme like the CAA. E.g., Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 570 (1980) (reversing
appellate court for failure to heed federal agency’s “expert
judgment” contained in nonbinding guidance documents).
EPA’s thoroughness of consideration is evident in the
language of the preamble itself. See Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans,
45 Fed. Reg. at 52,695. EPA considered and addressed various
suggestions as to the breadth of the definition and ultimately
decided to adopt the primary-activity test. Id. Additionally, EPA
employed sound reasoning in its decision, citing a desire for

17

80 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 7

predictability, objectivity, and simplicity in determinations. Id.
This, coupled with an understanding of the complexity of
allocating resources, led EPA to a primary-activity determination
to classify a source based on standard industrial classifications.
Id. Not only did EPA thoroughly consider this well-reasoned
policy, it has consistently applied it over the years. See id.;
LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 261 (emphasizing EPA’s long-standing
adherence to the primary-activity test). At the very least, EPA’s
primary-activity test demands substantial Skidmore deference;
this Court therefore should follow EPA’s interpretation and find
that the Facility is not a fossil-fuel fired source.
B.

The Power Plant is a major emitting facility
because it has the potential to emit more than 250
tons per year of carbon monoxide,
notwithstanding the Village of Forestdale’s
operational limitations.

Although the proposed Facility is not a “fossil-fuel fired”
source, it is still a “major emitting facility.” Relevant here is the
second statutory definition: a “source with the potential to emit
two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.”
42 U.S.C. § 7479(1). Congress did not define the term “potential
to emit” within the confines of the PSD statute. Id. Accordingly,
EPA promulgated regulations defining a plant’s potential to emit
as including “restrictions on hours of operation” so long as the
restriction “is federally enforceable.” See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4).
In an unpublished opinion, the D.C. Circuit vacated this
definition because it limited the term “potential to emit” to
include only EPA-enforceable limitations on operation. Chem.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In response,
EPA issued guidance to address the D.C. Circuit’s concerns by
broadening its definition. Office of Air Quality Planning &
Standards, U.S. EPA, Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of
Limitations on Potential to Emit (Jan. 1996) (“Federal
Enforceability Policy”). This guidance warrants sufficient
deference to control this Court’s inquiry, and establishes that
Forestdale’s site plan is not a federally enforceable limitation for
purposes of the “potential to emit” calculation.
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Under EPA’s Federal Enforceability Policy, the
Forestdale site plan is not a federally
enforceable limitation, and therefore this
Court must judge the Facility’s “potential to
emit” on its 96% capacity factor.

EPA’s guidance states that the regulatory term “federal[]
enforceab[ility]” means “federally enforceable or legally and
practicably enforceable by a state or local air pollution control
agency.” Id. at 3–4; see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4). In other words,
operational limitations only come into play when calculating a
facility’s “potential to emit” if they are enforceable by an
environmental agency, whether on the federal, state, or local
level. Federal Enforceability Policy at 3–4. Thus, the emissions
decrease resulting from the Forestdale site plan’s limitation on
hours of operation, though environmentally laudable, only affects
the Facility’s “potential to emit” if the plan can be enforced by
EPA or NUARB. See id.
But Forestdale has not empowered either agency to police the
Facility’s hours of operation; rather, responsibility for
enforcement falls to the Village of Forestdale’s building inspector.
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. No matter how this Court feels about
building inspectors, surely it must agree that they are not “state
or local air pollution control agenc[ies].” Federal Enforceability
Policy, at 4. Therefore, the hours limitation in the site plan does
not enter into this Court’s “potential-to-emit” calculus, and the
Facility’s 96% capacity factor determines its classification under
the Act. Because the Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon
monoxide when operating at this level, NUARB did not act
arbitrarily in labeling it a “major emitting facility”; its decision
should accordingly be affirmed. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
a.

This Court should defer to the Federal
Enforceability Policy.

This Court does not need to be reminded that Chevron
deference reaches beyond the confines of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Supra, Part II.A.ii.a; Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221–22.
The congressional expectation that “the agency . . . be able to
speak with the force of law” may apply independent of formal
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agency procedures, Mead, 533 U.S. at 229, on a showing of
deference-conferring factors, Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. Several
such factors are present here.
First, the Policy’s interpretation has been applied for almost
twenty years. Id. at 220 (granting “particular deference to an
agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration”). Second, the
complexity of the Clean Air Act compels a degree of deference to
EPA’s administrative efforts, as the Agency has enough
experience with the Act to navigate its dense provisions. Gen.
Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1327. Third, the scientific expertise
necessary to administer the Act commands still more deference to
EPA’s interpretation. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377. Fourth, the Policy
reflects thorough consideration. Not only did two high-ranking
EPA officials sign off on it, but it also contains a thoughtful
response to the D.C. Circuit’s objections to the original regulation.
Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that
policies generally demonstrate thoroughness of consideration
when issued by upper-level officials); Federal Enforceability
Policy at 3–4. And fifth, EPA’s interpretation reaches a
reasonable result. The Federal Enforceability Policy prevents the
absurd result of putting the administration of the CAA in the
inexperienced hands of entities without environmental knowhow—reflecting congressional intent that EPA preside over the
administration of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601. Therefore, this
Court should grant Chevron deference to the Federal
Enforceability Policy.
But even if this Court declines to apply Chevron, the Policy is
still due substantial Skidmore deference. 323 U.S. at 140; see
supra, Part II.A.ii.a. It bears repeating that, although merely
persuasive, Skidmore can be a deciding factor in the
interpretation of a complex statute like the CAA. Milhollin, 444
U.S. at 570. And as demonstrated by the sheer number of factors
compelling deference in this case, EPA’s Policy should decide the
issue under whichever agency-deference rubric this Court chooses
to apply. Accordingly, because the hours limitation is not
federally enforceable, it does not decrease the Facility’s potential
to emit. Because the Facility will emit 255 tons per year of carbon
monoxide at 96% capacity, NUARB did not act arbitrarily or
capriciously in determining it to be a “major emitting facility.”
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III. BECAUSE THE POWER PLANT IS A MAJOR
EMITTING FACILITY SUBJECT TO PSD REVIEW,
SYLVANERGY MUST INSTALL BACT FOR
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS.
The Clean Air Act requires PSD-permit applicants to install
“the best available control technology for each pollutant [that is]
subject to regulation under [the Act]” and emitted by the facility.
42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (emphasis added). In other words, BACT
applies not only to the pollutants that trigger the “major emitting
facility” threshold, see id. § 7479(3), but to every emitted
pollutant regulated by the CAA. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA,
134 S.Ct. 2427, 2448 (2014) (“[T]he BACT provision [cannot] bear
a narrowing construction.”). The notable breadth of this provision
is no accident. Rather, it reflects congressional recognition that
“preserv[ing], protect[ing], and enhanc[ing] the air quality” in our
nation’s pristine areas requires across-the-board regulation. 42
U.S.C. § 7470(2).
This breadth ties the BACT requirement to the evolving CAA
landscape—most importantly for purposes of this appeal, the
long-overdue move toward regulation of greenhouse gases.
Because of EPA’s promulgation of greenhouse gas emissions
standards for motor vehicles, greenhouse gases are now air
pollutants regulated under the CAA. See Light–Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600) (“Tailpipe Rule”).
Accordingly, the PSD program requires installation of BACT for
these gases. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4). And because neither the Act
nor the case law carves out an exception for the use of biomass
fuel, Sylvanergy has no legal basis to claim its wood-burning
plant is exempt from the BACT requirement. Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Once again, this
Court reviews NUARB’s decision on the markedly deferential
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–
97; 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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Greenhouse gases are “subject to regulation”
under the CAA, and therefore may be subject to
the BACT requirement.

After Massachusetts v. EPA read the CAA to authorize
regulation of greenhouse gases and required EPA to give a
statutory justification for its failure to do so, see 549 U.S. 497, 532
(2007), the Agency revamped its air-pollution regulation. See
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66,496, 66,699 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1)
(“Endangerment Finding”) (staking out EPA’s position that
greenhouse gases endanger public health). The Endangerment
Finding led to the promulgation of the Tailpipe Rule, in turn
“automatically trigger[ing] regulation of stationary greenhouse
gas emitters under” the PSD program. Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 115 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d
on other grounds, Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. 2427.4
Sylvanergy cannot keep a straight face and contest the
applicability of BACT to greenhouse gas emissions. Not only is
the CAA’s “each pollutant subject to regulation” language so
broad that the D.C. Circuit considered it beyond the realm of
reasonable misinterpretation, Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d
323, 404 (1979), but the Supreme Court has definitively closed
the door on this argument. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2449. One year
ago, the Court emphatically rejected this same contention and
held that “each pollutant subject to regulation” does not “mean
anything other than what it says.” Id. at 2448. Thus, where a
source is a “major emitting facility” by virtue of non-greenhouse
pollutants, EPA may require “compliance with greenhouse-gas
BACT” so long as “the source emits more than a de minimis
amount of greenhouse gases.” Id. at 2449.
4. EPA’s admittedly mistaken reading of the Act led it to draft further rules
to help ease the administrative burden of regulating greenhouse gases, which
are emitted more commonly and in greater amounts than other pollutants. See
Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2442–43. The Supreme Court struck these regulations
down as exceeding the scope of the CAA, id., but expressly approved EPA’s
position that it may apply BACT to greenhouse gases emitted by a source that is
a “major emitting facility” by reason of its emission of other pollutants. Id. at
2449.
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Sylvanergy has proposed such a source. Not only do its nongreenhouse emissions qualify it as a major emitting facility, see
supra Part II.B, but its full-capacity operation will cause the
emission of a hardly de minimis 350,000 tons per year of
greenhouse gases, see Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. Accordingly,
binding Supreme Court precedent authorizes NUARB’s
requirement of BACT for greenhouse emissions. Util. Air, 134
S.Ct. at 2449.
B.

Sylvanergy’s use of biomass fuel does not exempt
the Facility from the operation of the Clean Air
Act—including the requirement to install BACT.

Sylvanergy is left only with its argument that biomass-fueled
polluters should be categorically exempt from BACT for
greenhouse gases. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To support this
contention, it points to a temporary EPA regulation that has both
expired and been vacated by the D.C. Circuit, Biological
Diversity, 722 F.3d at 409–12, and to controversial (if not
outdated) science supporting a policy argument with no basis in
the text of the Act. Neither should persuade this Court. Rather,
because there is no statutory or regulatory authority for this
biomass exemption, and the prevailing scientific views undermine
Sylvanergy’s stance, this Court should uphold NUARB’s
requirement of BACT for Sylvanergy’s greenhouse gas emissions.
First, the so-called “Deferral Rule.” Deferral for CO2
Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources Under the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V
Programs, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011) (codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 52, 52, 70, 71) (“Deferral Rule”). In the Deferral Rule,
EPA sought to delay PSD review of biomass-fueled sources so
that it could better understand the interplay between the
greenhouse gases emitted by these sources and the carbon
sequestration caused by regrowth of the biofuels. Id. at 43,496.
But no matter how helpful this rule would be to Sylvanergy’s
present appeal, it is no longer valid. By its own terms the rule
was to expire more than a year ago. Id. at 43,490. But even before
its July 2014 expiration date, the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule as
unjustified by the doctrines of administrative law that EPA
invoked to justify the regulation. Biological Diversity, 722 F.3d at
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409–12. As a result, Sylvanergy must turn to the statutory text to
support its claimed exemption. But this, the petitioner cannot do.
The CAA plainly requires the installation of BACT in major
emitting facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a). The Act defines a “major
emitting facility” to include both “fossil-fuel fired” sources with
potential to emit 100 or more tons per year, and “any other source
with the potential to emit [250] tons per year or more of any air
pollutant”; it gives no further qualification on which to base this
biofuel exception. Id. § 7479(1). Nor do EPA’s definitional
regulations provide a basis to claim this exception. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.21(b)(1)(i) (no mention of bioenergy). Sylvanergy would have
this Court rewrite the CAA to add an exception for biomassfueled sources—an exception that simply is not there. See 42
U.S.C. § 7479; Comm’r v. Asphalt Prods. Co., Inc., 482 U.S. 117,
121 (1987) (explaining that courts may not “disregard what
Congress has plainly and intentionally provided” in statutory
text). Such a result is unwarranted by the text, and flouts
Supreme Court precedent. Util. Air, 134 S.Ct. at 2445 (rejecting
an attempt to “rewrite[e] unambiguous statutory terms” in §
169(1) of the Clean Air Act).
Finally, hobbled by the lack of statutory and regulatory
support for its position, Sylvanergy limps into a policy appeal.
The petitioner argued before the EAB that the greenhouse gas
emissions due to the burning of “biomass fuels such as wood . . .
are fully offset” by forest regrowth and the resulting “carbon
sequestration.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 8. To be sure, this idea once
warranted serious scientific consideration and was even the basis
of EPA’s now-vacated Deferral Rule. See Deferral Rule at 43,492.
But the intervening years of research have not been kind to this
hypothesis. E.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Comparative Life Cycle
Assessments: Carbon Neutrality & Wood Biomass Energy 9 (2013)
(“GHG emissions targets would not be assisted by the use of
bioenergy.”); accord Carla Santos & Alisha Falberg, Light My
Fire: The Use & Policies of Woody Biomass as a Heat Source, 15
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 41, 43 (2015) (reviewing the
scholarship and concluding that “woody biomass for energy can
no longer be considered a ‘carbon neutral source’”). Thus, not only
is Sylvanergy’s claimed exemption completely detached from the
text of the statute; it is bad policy. This Court therefore should
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uphold NUARB’s application of BACT to Sylvanergy’s greenhouse
gas emissions.
IV. NUARB PERMISSIBLY REJECTED WOOD
GASIFICATION AND PARTIAL CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE AS BACT BECAUSE
THE CONCEPT REDEFINES THE FACILITY.
Here also, this Court asks whether NUARB’s action was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S.at 496–97. It bears
repeating—this standard of review is notably deferential. See
supra Part II.
A.

WGPCCS redefines the Facility because it changes
the Facility’s fundamental scope.

Historically, EPA has not asked applicants to redefine their
sources when considering available control alternatives as part of
the BACT requirement. NSR Manual at B.13. For example, EPA
has not required applicants proposing a coal-fired electric
generator to consider building a natural gas-fired electric turbine
as part of their BACT analysis, despite the fact that the turbine
may be inherently less polluting than the generator. Id.
Admittedly, state agencies have the discretion to engage in a
“broader analysis,” which might include “the consideration of
alternative production processes.” Id. But the decision to engage
or not engage in an analysis beyond standard control technologies
is committed entirely to the permit authority’s judgment. See id.;
accord Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831. Here, NUARB permissibly chose
not to consider alternative production processes as part of its
BACT analysis. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7.
i.

Changing a facility’s “fundamental scope”
redefines that facility.

In re Desert Rock Energy Co. outlines the test for whether an
available control alternative redefines the relevant source. 14
E.A.D. 484 (EAB 2009). In Desert Rock, the EAB stated, “[T]he
permit applicant initially ‘defines the proposed facility’s end,
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object, aim, or purpose—that is the facility’s basic design . . . .’”
Id. at 530 (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Prairie State
Generating Co., 13 E.A.D. 1, 22 (EAB 2006)). The permitting
agency does more than simply rubber stamp the applicant’s
design, though: the permit issuer should take a “hard look” to
determine which design elements are inherent and which might
be changed without disrupting the design’s purpose. Id. (quoting
Prairie State, 13 E.A.D at 26). But the permitting agency has
“broad discretion” to determine the mutability or immutability of
design elements. Id.
Prairie State and Desert Rock outline the dichotomy between
available control alternatives that redefine their source—and
that might be permissibly rejected—and those that must be
treated in the BACT analysis. In Prairie State, the EAB refused
to require consideration of an alternative fuel (low-sulfur coal) as
possible BACT for a proposed coal-fired power plant co-located
with a high-sulfur coal mine. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see
also Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13. The power plant in Prairie State
was designed to burn the locally available coal, so requiring lowsulfur coal as BACT would have impermissibly “redefined” the
source. Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. at 28; see also Sylvanergy, slip op.
at 13.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Prairie State decision in
Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 2007). The appellate
court emphasized that “to convert the design from that of a minemouth plant to one that burned coal obtained from a distance
would require that the plant undergo significant modifications.”
Id. at 655 (emphasis added). In light of EPA precedent, the court
wrote against requiring proposed facilities to change their
“fundamental scope” or an “inherent aspect of the proposed
project.” Id. at 655–56. The court noted that when it is not
obvious where to draw the line between control technology and
redesign, “it makes sense to let the [agency] . . . draw it, within
reason.” Id. at 655.
Post-Prairie State and Sierra Club, the EAB handed down
its decision in Desert Rock and granted EPA’s motion for
voluntary remand of a PSD permit it had issued for a proposed
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coal-fired electric generating facility.5 Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at
540. The Board also remanded the permit on the independent
ground that EPA had “abused its discretion” in declining to
consider IGCC as part of its BACT analysis. Id. The Board found
two facts important: first, EPA failed to provide a rational
explanation why IGCC would redefine the source, particularly
when the applicant itself had indicated that IGCC was a
technology capable of satisfying its business purpose; second,
EPA failed to adequately explain its conclusion when IGCC had
been analyzed at similar facilities. Id. at 538. The Board
remanded the PSD permit for EPA to provide further explanation
for its determination that IGCC would redefine the source, or for
the Agency to include IGCC in its BACT analysis. Id. at 539.
ii. WGPCCS changes the fundamental scope of
the Facility.
The present case mirrors Prairie State and differs
significantly from Desert Rock. Similar to Sierra Club (which
upheld Prairie State), conversion of Sylvanergy’s proposed facility
from one that “generate[s] electricity by burning wood” to one
that generates electricity by “gasifying wood and burning gas”
would require the Facility to undergo “significant modifications.”
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 13; Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. It would
change the Facility’s “fundamental scope” by altering an
“inherent aspect of the proposed project”—namely the primary
means of electricity generation at the facility, burning wood.
Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655–56.
Even if this Court believes that WGPCCS straddles the line
between control technology and redesign of the Facility, NUARB’s
determination of redesign was hardly arbitrary. See id. at 656
(citing Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97) (“We hesitate in a
5. It bears emphasizing that the remand in Desert Rock was voluntary. The
Board did nothing that EPA did not want it to do. EPA itself approached the
Board seeking remand of the permit, for a variety of reasons. Desert Rock, 14
E.A.D. at 488–89. Among them: so that it might reconsider its failure to include
integrated gasification combined cycle (“IGCC”) in its BACT analysis. Id. at 488.
Unsurprisingly, the case for remand is stronger when the agency itself pushes
for remand. Cf. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831 (noting the peculiar expertise of
agencies).
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borderline case . . . to pronounce the [agency’s] decision arbitrary
. . . .”). There is a distinction in this case between the tendency of
WGPCCS to redesign the Facility and its availability as a
potential control technology. But that distinction is one of degree,
and potentially minute; the treatment of such differences in a
technically complex field with limited statutory guidance "is
entrusted to the judgment of the agency.” Id. (citing Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842–43).
Different from Desert Rock, NUARB did not file a motion
for voluntary remand of the PSD permit issued to Sylvanergy. To
be sure, the Board in Desert Rock also found an independent
ground for remand: EPA abused its discretion in declining to
consider IGCC as part of its BACT analysis, based on the scant
administrative record. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 540. But
with EPA’s motion for voluntary remand firmly situated at the
heart of the proceedings in Desert Rock, the Board’s focus on
remand rather than agency discretion was unremarkable. This
Court should accordingly place little emphasis on the Board’s
independent ground for remand in Desert Rock.
Even so, the two factors that led the EAB to independently
remand in Desert Rock are not present here. There is no evidence
that Sylvanergy represented at any point that WGPCCS was a
technology that could be considered for its facility, i.e., that could
satisfy its business purpose. See generally Sylvanergy. Neither is
there evidence of previously issued permits at facilities similar to
Sylvanergy’s in which WGPCCS was analyzed. See generally id.
NUARB was under no obligation to offer an enhanced
explanation, like that required under the tenets of Desert Rock,
for its determination that WGPCCS redefines the Facility. The
agency only had to give a traditional “hard look” at the facility’s
alleged purpose and had broad discretion to make its redesign
determination from there. See Desert Rock, 14 E.A.D. at 530.
NUARB did just that, and permissibly rejected WGPCCS as
BACT for the Facility.
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NUARB’s analysis was sufficiently rigorous
because the agency considered carbon capture
and storage generally, among other alternatives,
in line with EPA guidance.

Lending support to the rigor of its BACT analysis, NUARB
considered carbon capture and storage generally and rejected it
as technically infeasible at the Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at
6. Where greenhouse gas emissions are the subject of BACT
analysis, EPA guidance classifies carbon capture and
sequestration as an “available” add-on pollution control
technology. See Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA, Guidance
for Determining Best Available Control Technology for Reducing
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production 13 (2011)
(“Guidance—Bioenergy Production”). Furthermore, EPA guidance
states that carbon capture and sequestration “should be listed” as
part of BACT analysis for greenhouse gases, although “[t]his does
not necessarily mean [it] should be selected.” Id. at 14. NUARB
adhered to EPA’s guidance: “It first considered . . . carbon capture
and storage,” but rejected that concept because “there was no
proven technology.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 6.
WGPCCS differs significantly from carbon capture and
sequestration. The former partially incorporates the latter, but it
also adds the specific design element of wood gasification to the
generalized concept of carbon capture and storage. EPA directs
that carbon capture and sequestration should be included, at
least initially, in BACT analysis for greenhouse gases. See
Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 14. But EPA leaves to the
discretion of permitting agencies whether to include more
specialized, design-specific forms of carbon capture and
sequestration, such as WGPCCS, in BACT analysis. To
understand otherwise—to require inclusion of specialized forms
of carbon capture and sequestration—is to read into EPA
guidance words that simply are not there. See Schooler v. United
States, 231 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1956) (“Confusion results when
an attempt is made to read into the law words which are not
there.”). Regardless, NUARB’s consideration of carbon capture
and storage as BACT for the Facility demonstrates the agency’s
commitment to EPA guidance and the overarching rigor with
which it conducted its BACT analysis.
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V. NUARB PROPERLY IMPOSED THE
SUSTAINABLE FOREST PLAN AS BACT
BECAUSE THE PLAN IS NOT A “BEYOND-THEFENCE” MEASURE, AND REGARDLESS, THE
CAA DOES NOT OUTLAW SUCH MEASURES.
Again, this Court may only ask whether NUARB’s action was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 496–97. It bears
emphasizing—this standard of review is quite deferential. See
supra Part II.
A.

Biofuel combustion is not—of itself—BACT
because the process can act as a net source of
carbon.

Before the EAB, Sylvanergy took the position that NUARB
impermissibly imposed the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT
because, “since all biofuels are renewable fuels, biofuel
combustion should be considered BACT per se without any
additional controls.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11. This position is
untenable in light of EPA guidance and scientific authority. See
generally Guidance—Bioenergy Production; supra Part II
(concerning the deference due agency proclamations). In essence,
Sylvanergy contends that “the combustion of biofuels, by its very
nature, is fully offset by the carbon sequestration effects of biofuel
production.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11. Sylvanergy glosses over a
principle fatal to its position, though.
Carbon sequestration can indeed offset the combustion of
biofuels, but it does not always do so fully. See Guidance—
Bioenergy Production at 6; accord Santos & Falberg, supra Part
III.B (concluding that biomass is not a “carbon neutral” source).
EPA guidance states, “[B]iogenic carbon stocks can act as a sink .
. . .” Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 6 (emphasis added). But
importantly, the guidance also notes that “if more carbon is
released than is sequestered, plant biomass acts as a net source of
carbon.” Id. (emphasis added). When plant biomass is a net
source of carbon, “[g]reenhouse gases emitted by the facility are
still pollutants, and they may still be subject to controls.” See
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11.
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At the permitting stage, Sylvanergy did not provide evidence
to NUARB that its facility will be a net sink for carbon, rather
than a net source of carbon. See generally id. Sylvanergy’s
proposed facility has the potential to emit 350,000 tons per year
of carbon dioxide equivalents.6 Id. at 5. Yet Sylvanergy “made no
commitment that its fuel sources [will] be sustainably harvested,”
and thus no commitment that its facility’s “net atmospheric
impact [will be] accounted for and . . . negative or zero.” Id. at 11
(emphasis added); Guidance—Bioenergy Production at 8
(highlighting the importance of a net-negative or zero
atmospheric impact); see also Santos & Falberg, supra Part III.B.
B.

The Sustainable Forest Plan is not a “beyond-thefence” measure because it is entirely within the
control of Sylvanergy, and regardless, the CAA
does not outlaw such measures.

Sylvanergy also takes the position that NUARB
impermissibly imposed the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for
its facility because “BACT cannot include ‘beyond-the-fence’
mitigation measures unrelated to the control of the actual
emissions from the facility.” Id. at 11. This argument fails for two
reasons: first, because the Plan is not a beyond-the-fence
measure; second, and regardless of the first reason, because the
CAA does not proscribe such measures.
i.

The Plan is entirely within the control of
Sylvanergy.

To the first point, the Sustainable Forest Plan is not a
“beyond-the-fence” measure. The decisive factor in whether a
measure is beyond the fence is control. See Carbon Pollution
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,829, 34,888 (June 18,
2014) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). For a measure to be beyond
the fence, it must be “implemented outside of the affected units
6. The Facility will in fact emit 262,500 tons per year in light of its
operating limits. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 5. But those limits are not federally
enforceable, and therefore do not affect the potential-to-emit calculation. See
supra Part II.B.
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and outside their control.” Id. (emphasis added). The Sustainable
Forest Plan is not outside the control of Sylvanergy, though. See
Sylvanergy, slip op. at 11–12 (finding that the Plan is “entirely
within the control of Sylvanergy”). The Facility encompasses the
dedicated reforestation area, such that one part of the Facility
tempers emissions from another part of the Facility. Id.
ii. The CAA does not outlaw beyond-the-fence
measures.
Second, even if the Sustainable Forest Plan is a beyond-thefence measure, the CAA does not outlaw such measures: many
provisions of the Act are open-ended and lend themselves—often
intentionally—to agency discretion. See Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at
2439 (“[W]e presume that when an agency-administered statute
is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, Congress has
empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity.”).
Given that statutory leeway, EPA guidance suggests that
beyond-the-fence measures are appropriate for BACT
consideration in the context of greenhouse gas emissions:
“[B]ecause sequestration of CO2 emissions in living plant material
outside the boundaries of the facility may counteract the
emissions from such facilities on a continuous basis, this unique
dynamic merits consideration in the BACT analysis.” Guidance—
Bioenergy Production at 8. Greenhouse gases are “well-mixed” in
the atmosphere, so “the need to reduce them directly at the
facility is of lesser importance so long as their net atmospheric
impact is accounted for and is negative or zero.” Id.; cf. Carbon
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. at 34,888–89
(“[W]e propose that the provisions of CAA section 111 do not by
their terms preclude the BSER [Best System of Emission
Reduction] from including [beyond-the-fence] measures.”). This
Court should effectuate EPA’s reasonable understanding of
greenhouse gas science and the BACT requirement and allow
consideration of beyond-the-fence measures. See Fed. Exp. Corp.
v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008) (holding that where
ambiguity exists, “the agency may choose among reasonable
alternatives”).
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NUARB had a cogent rationale for selecting the
Sustainable Forest Plan.

SOC argues that NUARB impermissibly imposed the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT because the Plan “should have
been rejected . . . as having unacceptable adverse environmental
impacts.” Sylvanergy, slip op. at 12. Namely, SOC alleges that the
Sustainable Forest Plan will “destroy biodiversity and promote
tree diseases and pest invasions.” Id. The EAB noted that
NUARB did not specifically address SOC’s concerns at
permitting, but the Board also went on to find “no clear error” in
the agency’s failure to treat them. Id.
NUARB is under no obligation to respond directly to every
comment it receives from all interested parties. See Am. Airlines,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); see also
Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497. The issuance of a PSD permit is an
informal adjudication, as the CAA does not require that the
determination be made “on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing.” 5 U.S.C § 554(a) (emphasis added); see also
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 727 F.2d
1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that formal adjudications
are only necessary where the statute requires a determination
“on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”)
(emphasis added); compare 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) (no such
requirement). And “an agency can define its own procedures for
conducting an informal adjudication,” which do not have to
include addressing each comment it receives. Am. Airlines, 202
F.3d at 797 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496
U.S. 633, 655-56 (1990)); see also Sierra Club v. Peterson, 185
F.3d 349, 367 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pension Benefit, 496
U.S. at 655) (“An ‘informal adjudication [like the PSD-permit
process] . . . contains only ‘minimal requirements[.]’”).
Moreover, in the context of a BACT determination, “[e]ven
when an agency explains its decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’
a reviewing court will not upset the decision on that account ‘if
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Alaska Dep’t,
540 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted). NUARB had a cogent rationale
for selecting the Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the
Facility. See Sylvanergy, slip op. at 7. The agency grounded its
decision in the economic feasibility of the Plan, and its estimated
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70% offset of the facility’s greenhouse gas emissions. Id. Supreme
Court precedent will not allow this Court to “upset” NUARB’s
decision. Alaska Dep’t, 540 U.S. at 497.

CONCLUSION

This Court lacks jurisdiction over the NAD denial. The denial
was neither the end of NUARB’s decisionmaking process nor a
determination of Sylvanergy’s rights and obligations, and
accordingly was not the sort of “final action” this Court has the
power to review. Sylvanergy cannot avoid this result by twisting
the words of the APA, because the denial was committed to
NUARB’s discretion and therefore outside the purview of the
APA’s judicial-review provisions.
Even if this Court can review the “major emitting facility”
determination, NUARB did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in
so classifying the Facility. Although the plain text of the CAA and
EPA’s primary-activity test show that the Facility’s ULSD startup burners do not make it a fossil-fuel fired source, the Facility is
still a major emitter by reason of its potential to emit more than
250 tons per year of carbon monoxide. The site plan imposed by
the Village of Forestdale is not a federally enforceable limitation
under EPA guidance, and consequently does not affect the
Facility’s potential to emit. Accordingly, NUARB did not act
arbitrarily in finding the Power Plant to be a major emitting
facility.
Similarly, NUARB’s requirement of BACT for the Facility’s
greenhouse gas emissions was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
EPA regulation of greenhouse gases in the motor-vehicle context
triggered PSD requirements for greenhouse emissions, as
recognized by the Supreme Court. Because the Facility will emit
a massive amount of greenhouse gases per year, and neither the
Act itself nor sound policy allow for a biofuel-plant exemption,
NUARB properly required Sylvanergy to install BACT for
greenhouse emissions.
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And finally, NUARB’s robust procedures and peculiar
expertise were at their zenith when the agency selected the
Sustainable Forest Plan as BACT for the Facility. The agency
employed a rigorous top-down approach to analyze the available
control alternatives—the same diligent approach outlined by EPA
guidance. The Plan represented the most effective, technically
feasible alternative that did not require Sylvanergy to change the
fundamental scope of its project. The Plan is a sensible
alternative—economically manageable, technically effective, and
accessible to Sylvanergy. NUARB properly selected it as BACT
for the Facility.
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